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M uch writing and dis-cussion have focused on fusion centers as 
a key element of a homeland 
security strategy within polic-
ing. These centers have propo-
nents in the homeland security 
and public safety policy-making 
structures, as well as critics 
from civil liberties groups and 
privacy advocates. A great deal 
of misperception exists on all 
sides of the issue regarding the 
role of fusion centers and intel-
ligence gathering within polic-
ing in general.
The concepts of fusion 
centers, data fusion, and the 
associated philosophy of intel-
ligence-led policing are abstract 
terms often misinterpreted and 
poorly articulated both in and 
out of law enforcement. While 
police departments traditionally 
have had an intelligence- and 
information-sharing function, 
the term fusion may be new to  
some in the profession.1 Simi-
larly, intelligence-led policing, 
which has many similarities 
to community and problem-
oriented policing, might prove 
relatively unfamiliar to some 
ofﬁcers.2 As a result, the incor-
poration of fusion centers  
and intelligence-led policing  
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principles into routine law en-
forcement functions has been a 
slow and uneven process. How-
ever, doing so can make police 
agencies more effective.
DEFINITIONS
Data fusion is “the ex-
change of information from dif-
ferent sources—including law 
enforcement, public safety, and 
the private sector—and, with 
analysis, can result in meaning-
ful and actionable intelligence 
and information” that can 
inform both policy and tacti-
cal deployment of resources.3 
Building upon classic problem-
solving processes, such as the 
scanning, analysis, response, 
and assessment (SARA) model, 
data fusion capitalizes on a 
wide array of available data to 
examine issues ranging from 
terrorism to traditional street 
crime. Through data fusion, 
personnel turn information into 
knowledge by collecting, pro-
cessing, analyzing, and dissemi-
nating intelligence based upon 
end users’ needs.
A fusion center is a “col-
laborative effort of two or more 
agencies that provide resources, 
expertise, and information 
to the center with the goal of 
maximizing their ability to 
detect, prevent, investigate, and 
respond to criminal and terrorist 
activity.”4 Fusion centers can 
identify potential threats through 
data analysis and enhance 
investigations through analytical 
support (e.g., ﬂow charting and 
geographic analysis).
Finally, intelligence-led 
policing (ILP) refers to a “col-
laborative law enforcement 
approach combining problem-
solving policing, information 
sharing, and police accountabil-
ity, with enhanced intelligence 
operations.”5 ILP can guide op-
erational policing activities to-
ward high-frequency offenders, 
locations, or crimes to impact 
resource allocation decisions.
ROLE OF FUSION  
CENTERS
Fusion centers allow for the 
exchange of information and 
intelligence among law enforce-
ment and public safety agencies 
at the federal, state, and local 
levels. A variety of indica-
tors, such as gang behavior, 
weapons violations, or metals 
thefts, span jurisdictions. The 
growth of fusion centers dem-
onstrates that no one police or 
public safety organization has 
all of the information it needs 
to effectively address crime 
problems. Progressive fusion 
centers have access to a wide 
variety of databases, many of 
which previously were acces-
sible only by individual federal, 
state, or local law enforcement 
organizations. Agency participa-
tion in multijurisdictional fusion 
centers diminishes “stovepipes” 
of information.
Pooling resources, such as 
analysts and information sys-
tems, can maximize limited 
assets at a time when all agen-
cies face budget cutbacks. Col-
laboration across organizations 
blends subject-matter expertise 
in areas, such as homeland 
security, violent crime, and 
“
”Sergeant Lambert serves in the Massachusetts  State Police Commonwealth Fusion Center.
Through data  
fusion, personnel  
turn information into 
knowledge by collecting, 
processing, analyzing, 
and disseminating  
intelligence based upon 
end users’ needs.
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drug control. It builds trusted 
relationships across participat-
ing agencies, which encourages 
additional collaboration. Fusion 
centers foster a culture of infor-
mation sharing and break down 
traditional barriers that stand in 
the way.6
Combining data from mul-
tiple agencies enables policy 
makers and police managers to 
see trends and patterns not as 
apparent when using a single 
information source. Employing 
multiple sources helps present a 
more credible picture of crime 
and homeland security issues, 
as when personnel examine 
ﬁeld interview data in conjunc-
tion with crime incident reports. 
Personnel often underreport 
drug or gang offenses, while 
ﬁeld interview cards collected 
by street ofﬁcers with intimate 
knowledge of the community 
may provide a more valid mea-
sure of illegal drug use or gang 
behavior. Using multiple indica-
tors strengthens the information 
and results in a more coherent 
and accurate intelligence  
product.
MASSACHUSETTS  
EXPERIENCE
Commonwealth  
Fusion Center
In October 2004, Massa-
chusetts ofﬁcials opened the 
Commonwealth Fusion Center 
(CFC) to focus on terrorism, 
homeland security, and crime 
problems across the state. While 
addressing homeland security 
challenges is the driving force 
behind the center, traditional 
street crimes occur more fre-
quently. The CFC constitutes 
part of the Massachusetts 
State Police (MSP), Division 
of Investigative Services, and 
employs state troopers and 
intelligence analysts. Com-
mitted staff members from the 
National Guard, Massachusetts 
Department of Corrections, 
FBI, Department of Home-
land Security, and Bureau of 
on drug control, interdiction, 
and narcotics intelligence.
Targeting Violent 
Crime Initiative
As an all-crimes informa-
tion-sharing and intelligence 
center, the CFC devotes a sig-
niﬁcant portion of its analytical 
resources to examining emerg-
ing crime trends. In this regard, 
the U.S. Department of Justice 
(DOJ), Bureau of Justice As-
sistance, sponsored the Target-
ing Violent Crime Initiative, 
a grant program giving police 
agencies an incentive to use an 
ILP approach to address vio-
lence. The CFC, responding to 
a call from state policy makers 
to examine violent and, speciﬁ-
cally, ﬁrearms crime throughout 
the state, proposed to develop a 
fusion process around weapons 
offenses.
This effort centers around 
answering questions about 
ﬁrearms in Massachusetts. First, 
where do guns used in crimes 
come from? In other words, do 
ﬁrearms used by criminals—
many prohibited from legally 
owning guns—originate from 
trafﬁckers bringing them into 
the state, individuals stealing 
them from businesses or homes, 
or other sources? Second, are 
the lesser-known illegal ﬁre-
arms markets in Springﬁeld, 
Worcester, and Brockton the 
same as in Boston? Finally, 
what are the trends of ﬁrearms 
crime in various parts of the 
”
Fusion centers allow 
for the exchange  
of information and  
intelligence among law 
enforcement and  
public safety agencies 
at the federal, state, 
and local levels.
“
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, 
and Explosives (ATF) reﬂect 
its multijurisdictional nature. 
Other agencies participate in 
the CFC on a part-time or as-
needed basis. In addition, the 
CFC is colocated with the New 
England High Intensity Drug 
Trafﬁcking Area (NE-HIDTA). 
This program also incorporates 
a number of federal, state, and 
local police agencies to focus 
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state? Is it on the rise in most 
large communities or do pat-
terns vary? Which areas have 
the most stress from ﬁrearms 
crime? Answers to such broad 
questions can inform policy 
making.
ILP for Firearms Violence
Like many other states, 
Massachusetts has a number of 
public safety entities involved 
in violent crime reduction ef-
forts. To this end, one objec-
tive of the CFC’s DOJ-funded 
Intelligence-Led Policing for 
Firearms Violence project is 
to supplement, not duplicate, 
existing violent crime programs. 
Through the development of 
tactical and strategic intel-
ligence products, the fusion 
center has sought to help these 
it with new data to provide stra-
tegic and tactical intelligence to 
end users so that they can make 
informed decisions. The CFC 
serves as the state crime report-
ing repository using the FBI’s 
Uniform Crime Reporting Pro-
gram’s National Incident-Based 
Reporting System (NIBRS) to 
collect crime information. This 
data provides details on crime 
incidents across jurisdictions 
on a year-to-year and month-to-
month basis and offers specif-
ics on types of crime, such as 
aggravated assaults by ﬁrearm 
type and offender age and 
gender. For instance, the NI-
BRS data set allowed the CFC 
to closely examine ﬁrearms 
offenses committed by youths 
aged 10 to 17 across various 
communities to study juvenile 
gun crime.
As another valuable source 
of information, the ATF’s 
National Tracing Center col-
lects and disseminates data on 
ﬁrearms recovered from crimes. 
Participating police departments 
submit a request to ATF, which 
traces the origins of the ﬁrearm 
through various databases and 
then provides information on 
the ﬁrst retail purchaser, the 
licensed dealer that sold the 
ﬁrearm, and the type and manu-
facturer of the weapon. This 
trace data provides both tacti-
cal and strategic intelligence 
to investigators, patrol ofﬁ-
cers, intelligence analysts, and 
decision makers. For instance, 
identifying the city and state of 
public safety agencies arrive  
at informed, data-driven  
decisions.7
Working cooperatively 
with the U.S. Attorney’s Ofﬁce, 
Massachusetts State Police’s 
ﬁrearms identiﬁcation section 
and its crime laboratory, Boston 
Police Department, ATF, Mas-
sachusetts Criminal History 
Systems Board, and other local 
police agencies, CFC began col-
lecting, processing, and analyz-
ing crime and weapons-trace 
data to provide policy makers 
with data on ﬁrearms crime 
patterns, the types of weapons 
recovered at crime scenes or 
during arrests, and the source 
cities and states of these guns. 
This project also has fo-
cused on leveraging existing 
information and supplementing 
U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance Targeting 
Violent Crimes Initiative: Intelligence-Led Policing - Firearms in MA
Source: Commonwealth Fusion Center Crime Reporting Unit  
National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS)
Aggravated Assault & Weapons  
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the ﬁrst retail purchase of a ﬁre-
arm involved in a crime, as well 
as the amount of time elapsed 
between purchase and offense, 
provides a possible indicator of 
ﬁrearms trafﬁcking. 
In addition, the project has 
accessed summary data collect-
ed from the MSP crime labora-
tory and the state’s criminal 
justice information system to 
track ﬁrearms patterns in the 
commonwealth. These sources 
provide information on the 
varieties of weapons, types of 
crimes, and patterns of owner-
ship for guns used in offenses. 
Employing these data sources—
rarely used for analysis prior to 
this—the project determined the 
number of ﬁrearms recovered 
at crimes and identiﬁed 
the weapons’ journey to 
crime.
Fusing this criminal 
offense data with infor-
mation on gun tracing, 
recovered ﬁrearms, and 
state weapon sales infor-
mation provides investi-
gators, police executives, 
and policy makers with 
a more comprehensive 
picture of ﬁrearms crimes 
in the state. Over the last 
year, the project has pro-
duced a number of intel-
ligence briefs and ana-
lytical reports that outline 
gun violence by youth 
offenders or violent trends 
across communities.
The CFC disseminates intel-
ligence briefs, analyses, and 
crime maps to policy makers 
and police administrators across 
the state to assist with resource 
deployment and the design of 
best practices to address ﬁre-
arms crime. In addition, the 
fusion center feeds these prod-
ucts back to information collec-
tors, such as investigators and 
patrol ofﬁcers, to reinforce their 
information-gathering efforts. 
This creates buy-in from collec-
tors and illustrates the need for 
high-quality, accurate data.
As the map indicates, this 
type of data illustrates the 
geographic journey to crime for 
guns used in crimes in Massa-
chusetts. Rather than conﬁrming 
the common wisdom that only 
southern states fuel gun traf-
ﬁcking in Massachusetts, the 
project found that crime-related 
guns can originate from a num-
ber of states within the North-
east, the South, and beyond. 
This has important statewide 
implications for criminal justice 
policy.
CONCLUSION
The fusion center concept 
involving various criminal 
justice agencies opens a number 
of possibilities for enhancing 
intelligence-led policing. It 
establishes relationships among 
federal, state, and local agen-
cies, which leads to improved 
information sharing and access 
Source: ATF eTrace submissions from the MSP Firearms Identiﬁcation  
Section since January 2009.
Crime Gun Source States
January to April 2009
to data that often was isolated 
in a single agency. It also brings 
together subject-matter exper-
tise that provides a more rel-
evant and credible intelligence 
end product. It creates buy-in 
from various agencies because 
they had input into its design.
This particular ILP project 
outlines a practical application 
of data fusion for traditional 
violent crime policy, easily 
transferable to homeland secu-
rity and terrorism issues. Using 
existing and newly acquired 
data, fusion center analysts 
collect, process, analyze, and 
disseminate timely intelligence 
to decision makers at the feder-
al, state, and local levels. More 
knowledgeable operational, 
strategic, and tactical deploy-
ment choices can be made on 
the basis of these data-driven 
products. This initiative pro-
vides an example of how data 
fusion and fusion centers can 
assist in everyday law enforce-
ment challenges.
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T he editorial staff would like to make two clariﬁca-tions pertaining to the article, “Proactive Human 
Source Development,” which appeared in the November 
2010 issue. First, the scenario provided in the article is a 
ﬁctitious one. Second, when operating sources, investiga-
tors must remain aware of restrictions that may limit the 
types of information a particular source may offer. For 
example, sources employed by ﬁnancial organizations are 
subject to the provisions of the Right to Financial Privacy 
Act; those working for educational institutions are sub-
ject to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 
1974; and sources within the health care and counseling 
professions are subject to a myriad of restrictions with 
respect to information they may share.
Clariﬁcation
Proactive  
Human Source  
Development
By ROBIN K. DREEKE and KARA D. SIDENER
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